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INSIGHT

# Golden Dome: Funding in 2025 Reconciliation Law (H.R. 1; P.L. 119-21)

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## Introduction

A section in the 2025 budget reconciliation legislation often referred to as the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (P.L. 119-21, Title II, §20003) provided $24.4 billion for integrated air and missile defense. A joint House Armed Services Committee (HASC) and Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) reconciliation bill overview described the funding as going toward "Golden Dome for America" (hereinafter, Golden Dome), though Golden Dome is not mentioned in the bill.

Some Members of Congress have noted that few programmatic details about Golden Dome are available. Its estimated cost and technical feasibility have been the subject of congressional interest and debate. Congress may consider whether providing funding for Golden Dome in P.L. 119-21 signaled congressional support for the broader Golden Dome initiative and whether Congress has adequate information about Golden Dome to assess this issue. Congress's decisions regarding Golden Dome in P.L. 119-21 and other legislation could affect U.S. security, defense capabilities, and funding requirements, as well as the defense industrial base.

## What Is Golden Dome?

The "Golden Dome for America" (initially known as the "Iron Dome for America") is an executive branch initiative to develop an integrated air and missile defense system for the U.S. homeland. President Donald J. Trump officially introduced the initiative on January 27, 2025, with an executive order directing the Secretary of Defense to submit "a reference architecture, capabilities-based requirements, and an implementation plan for the next-generation missile defense shield." (For more on this order, see CRS Insight IN12544, *Golden Dome: Executive Order Overview and Issues for Congressional Consideration*.) According to a Department of Defense (DOD) press release from May 20, 2025, Golden Dome is to combine several systems intended to collectively protect the United States from "aerial attacks from any foe." This initiative marks a shift in U.S. homeland missile defense strategy, which previously aimed to defend against threats from rogue nations, such as North Korea, while relying on U.S. nuclear capabilities to deter threats from peer and near-peer states, such as Russia and China. The proposed architecture may

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incorporate and enhance existing capabilities (e.g., ground-based midcourse defense system) while developing, fielding, and integrating new capabilities (e.g., space-based interceptors and directed energy weapons).

# Section 20003 of Title II

On May 22, 2025, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 1. On June 3, SASC Chair Senator Roger Wicker released a draft version of Title II of the reconciliation bill. On June 25, Senator Wicker released an updated draft version. On July 1, the Senate passed an amendment (S.Amdt. 2360) to H.R. 1. On July 4, President Trump signed the bill into law (P.L. 119-21).

The House- and Senate-passed versions of Title II, Section 20003, would have provided $24.7 billion and $24.4 billion, respectively, in FY2025 mandatory funding (i.e., budget authority) for "enhancement of Department of Defense resources for integrated air and missile defense." P.L. 119-21 appropriated $24.4 billion to the Secretary of Defense to "remain available until September 30, 2029" for this purpose (see **Table 1**). Of this amount, $18.8 billion was appropriated for next-generation missile defense technologies and $5.9 billion for layered homeland defense.

The enacted legislation did not specify the extent to which the funding was for existing DOD programs, projects, and activities or new lines of effort. While Section 20014 of the House-passed version would have required DOD to provide Congress with a spending plan within 45 days of enactment, neither the Senate-passed version nor the enacted version included such a provision.

**Table 1. Funding for Integrated Air and Missile Defense in Proposed and Enacted Versions of H.R. 1 (P.L. 119-21, Title II, §20003)**

| House-Passed H.R. 1[a] | Senate-Passed Amendment (S.Amdt. 2360) to H.R. 1[b] | P.L. 119-21 |
|---|---|---|
| **Section 20003(a): Next Generation Missile Defense Technologies** | | |
| Section 20003(a)(1) would have provided $183 million for "Missile Defense Agency special programs." | No such provision. | No such provision. |
| Section 20003(a)(2) would have provided $250 million for "development and testing of directed energy capabilities by the Undersecretary for Research and Engineering." | Section 20003(a)(1) would have provided the same amount for the same purpose as the House provision. | Section 20003(a)(1) adopts the House provision. |
| Section 20003(a)(3) would have provided $300 million for "classified military space superiority programs run by the Strategic Capabilities Office." | No such provision. | No such provision. |
| Section 20003(a)(4) would have provided $500 million for "national security space launch infrastructure." | Section 20003(a)(2) would have provided the same amount for the same purpose as the House provision. | Section 20003(a)(2) adopts the House provision. |
| Section 20003(a)(5) would have provided $2 billion for "air moving target indicator military satellites." | Section 20003(a)(3) would have provided the same amount for the same purpose as the House provision. | Section 20003(a)(3) adopts the House provision. |
| Section 20003(a)(6) would have provided $400 million for "expansion of Multi-Service Advanced Capability Hypersonic Test Bed program." | Section 20003(a)(4) would have provided the same amount for the same purpose as the House provision. | Section 20003(a)(4) adopts the House provision. |

| House-Passed H.R. 1[a] | Senate-Passed Amendment (S.Amdt. 2360) to H.R. 1[b] | P.L. 119-21 |
|---|---|---|
| Section 20003(a)(7) would have provided $5.6 billion for "development of space-based and boost phase intercept capabilities." | Section 20003(a)(5) would have provided the same amount for the same purpose as the House provision. | Section 20003(a)(5) adopts the House provision. |
| Section 20003(a)(8) would have provided $2.4 billion for "the development of military non-kinetic missile defense effects." | No such provision. | No such provision. |
| Section 20003(a)(9) would have provided $7.2 billion for "the development, procurement, and integration of military space-based sensors." | Section 20003(a)(6) would have provided the same amount for the same purpose as the House provision. | Section 20003(a)(6) adopts the House provision. |
| No such provision. | Section 20003(a)(7) would have provided $2.55 billion for the "development, procurement, and integration of military missile defense capabilities." | Section 20003(a)(7) adopts the Senate provision. |
| **Section 20003(b): Layered Homeland Defense** | | |
| Section 20003(b)(1) would have provided $2.2 billion for "acceleration of hypersonic defense systems." | Section 20003(b)(1) would have provided the same amount for the same purpose as the House provision. | Section 20003(b)(1) adopts the House provision. |
| Section 20003(b)(2) would have provided $800 million for "accelerated development and deployment of next-generation intercontinental ballistic missile defense systems." | Section 20003(b)(2) would have provided the same amount for the same purpose as the House provision. | Section 20003(b)(2) adopts the House provision. |
| Section 20003(b)(3) would have provided $408 million for "Army space and strategic missile test range infrastructure restoration and modernization in the United States Indo-Pacific Command area of operations west of the international dateline." | Section 20003(b)(3) would have provided the same amount for the same purpose as the House provision. | Section 20003(b)(3) adopts the House provision. |
| Section 20003(b)(4) would have provided $1.975 billion for "improved ground-based missile defense radars." | Section 20003(b)(4) would have provided the same amount for the same purpose as the House provision. | Section 20003(b)(4) adopts the House provision. |
| Section 20003(b)(5) would have provided $530 million for "the design and construction of Missile Defense Agency missile instrumentation range safety ship." | Section 20003(b)(5) would have provided the same amount for the same purpose as the House provision. | Section 20003(b)(5) adopts the House provision. |

**Source:** CRS analysis of proposed and enacted versions of H.R. 1.

**Notes:** For more information on defense provisions in H.R. 1, see CRS Insight IN12580, *Proposed Defense Funding in the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (H.R. 1, Title II)*.

a. Reflects the engrossed version of H.R. 1 of May 22, 2025.

b. Reflects the engrossed Senate amendment to the H.R. 1 (S.Amdt. 2360) of July 1, 2025.

# Issues for Congress

Following enactment of P.L. 119-21, Congress may consider whether or not to provide additional funding for and/or exercise oversight of the Golden Dome initiative for homeland air and missile defense. Some Members of Congress have introduced legislation in support of Golden Dome. Some Members of the Senate reportedly formed a Golden Dome Caucus on May 13, 2025, and some Members of the House on June 10, 2025. In hearings, Members have raised questions about the cost and feasibility of Golden Dome, as well as its implications for strategic stability. (For more on strategic stability as it relates to Golden Dome, see CRS Insight IN12568, *Golden Dome: Potential Strategic Stability Considerations for Congress*.) Congress may consider issues including but not limited to the following:

- In a May 20, 2025, press conference, President Trump described air and missile defense funding in the proposed reconciliation bill as an "initial deposit" toward Golden Dome. Does providing $24.4 billion in P.L. 119-21 signal congressional support for initiating Golden Dome as an acquisition effort? If so, to what degree does Congress's approval of such funding incur future commitments in, for example, maintenance and sustainment costs?
- The provisions in Section 20003 funded space-based sensors and defensive systems against missiles and hypersonic weapons, among other capabilities. Does such funding implement a particular technical approach for Golden Dome? To what extent does such funding augment capabilities already in use, accelerate programs in development, or introduce new technologies and operational concepts?
- The Trump Administration has described Golden Dome as a necessary investment to "protect the homeland from advanced missile threats." To what extent does the funding in P.L. 119-21—and the Golden Dome initiative, writ large—address such threats? Does Congress have sufficient information about such threats to assess the potential value of various air and missile defense capabilities?

# Options for Congress

In considering air and missile defense funding in other legislation, Congress has multiple options, including but not limited to the following:

- In general, Congress may approve, reject, or modify Administration funding requests and proposed acquisition strategies.
- Congress may consider whether to direct the Administration to share a detailed architecture and implementation plan for Golden Dome, as well as the threat assessment required in the January 27 order to support congressional assessment of the initiative. Congress may also consider whether to require DOD to provide additional information on the cost, schedule, technical approach and risks, and role of Golden Dome as an element of overall U.S. deterrent and warfighting strategy.
- Congress may consider whether to direct an independent assessment of the cost and feasibility of various homeland air and missile defense capabilities. Information on costs could include initial procurement costs and life-cycle operation and support (O&S) costs.

CRS has several products on topics relevant to U.S. homeland air and missile defense. For a non-exhaustive list, see CRS Report R48584, *Golden Dome: Related CRS Products*.

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