Myanmar's civil war continues to rage with no end in sight. Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) and the government in exile, the National Unity Government (NUG) and its associated People's Defense Forces (PDFs) continue to resist against the Myanmar military government known as the State Administration Council (SAC) and the Tatmadaw, Myanmar's armed forces. In 2024 the SAC implemented a conscription law that had been dormant since 2010 signaling that the SAC is deeply unpopular and that the Tatmadaw has been significantly weakened despite their superior airpower compared to the resistance. Since the beginning of July the SAC has reclaimed three strategic cities from resistance factions in Myanmar's Shan state while simultaneously seeing setbacks in the Mandalay region.

Shan State and Mandalay

Since the beginning of July the SAC has launched a series of operations targeted at three strategic towns located in Mandalay and Shan: Mobye, Nawnghkio, and on July 25th Thabeikkyin. Mobye was taken on July 5th after an offensive was launched by the Tatmadaw and its allied Pa-O National Army (PNA), an EAO that has been integrated into the Tatmadaw's "militia" structure since 2009. The town, located in southern Shan state was captured by the Karenni Nationalities Defense Force (KNDF) and allied PDFs in November 2023. However, the Tatmadaw's 422nd Light Infantry Brigade (LIB) base located just a mile outside of town was unable to be captured allowing the Tatmadaw and its allies to consolidate reinforcements at the base. This has been a common theme throughout the conflict; where bases, villages, and towns are taken but cannot be held permanently resistance forces due to a number of factors - namely indiscriminate airstrikes by the Tatmadaw with outdated and unguided munitions. Mobye is a critical logistics point for the Tatmadaw, as it connects southern Shan's Taunggyi City to the Karenni regional capital of Loikaw.

The next major town captured by the Tatmadaw was Nawnghkio on July 16th, which is located in northern Shan state and was used as a major trade route between China and Myanmar. The town was taken by the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) during Operation 1027, an offensive launched by an alliance of EAOs in the summer of 2024, which includes the Chinese backed Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA). The MNDAA agreed to a ceasefire with the SAC in January after intense Chinese pressure to do so, showcasing China's role in protecting its economic interests within the country. The Tatamadaw launched airstrikes and fired artillery at the town since its capture by the TNLA but only recently captured it after an assault by the Tatmadaw 11th and 54th divisions. Although the SAC rarely releases casualty figures, it can be assumed that the battle was quite costly due to the fact that many of the Tatmadaw's fighters are poorly trained conscripts, has low morale, and is lacking in supplies. Local media reported that after capturing the town the Tatmadaw began arresting and interrogating civilians they claim supported the TNLA. The town also holds strategic importance for the SAC as it can now be used as a staging ground for subsequent offensives against TNLA held territory, with airstrikes already reported in the neighboring towns of Kyaukme and Hsipaw.

Thabeikkyin in the Mandalay region is also an important town for the SAC as it is a major gold hub, is located on the Irrawaddy river which is a vital supply route for the Tatmadaw, and can be used to conduct attacks into Shan state, now allowing the regime to launch a pincer operation from both Nawnghkio and Thabeikkyin. The city was captured by the Mandalay PDF and the People's Liberation Army (PLA), the armed wing of the Communist Party of Burma, in August of last year. It is reported that clashes are still taking place on the towns outskirts. Although the taking of the three strategic cities is a major victory for the SAC, they had to mass vast amounts of manpower and supplies for months prior to taking the towns, two things the Tatmadaw is severely lacking in. In addition one of the main supply routes, the Irrawaddy river, is contested territory with several resistance groups controlling the banks of the river.

On July 22nd, it was reported that a complex ambush was conducted by the Mandalay PDF attacking a Tatmadaw supply boat convoy at various points including in Madaya, Singu, and Thabeikkyin townships. The convoy, made up of 12 boats - five of which carried troop reinforcements and seven carrying supplies and munitions, left from Mandalay city heading for Bhamo located in Kachin state. In video footage released by the PDF an assortment of arms were used in the attack including Drones, M2 Browning heavy machine guns, DShK heavy machine guns, Carl Gustav rocket launchers, RPG-7s, and an assortment of small arms from fortified bunker positions. This is in drastic contrast to the beginning of the conflict when many PDF units were armed with rudimentary homemade firearms and grenades. One ship was sunk and several others were severely damaged in the operation, despite Tatmadaw air cover consisting of Chinese made Y-12 aircraft and Russian made Mi-35 helicopters. This makes the Tatmadaw's victories over the last month irrelevant if they cannot protect essential supply routes to front line units, often isolated in towns and rural bases.

The State Administration Council (SAC)

The SAC, although isolated and lacking in manpower, morale, and supplies; does have backing from China, Russia, and Belarus who provide training to Tatmadaw forces as well as munitions and aircraft. The Chinese defense firm Norinco has been a key backer of Myanmar's defense base, both importing military equipment and advising Myanmar on its domestic arms manufacturing. China also provides diplomatic support to the SAC by using its leverage over EAOs to negotiate ceasefires. The two greatest examples are the MNDAA and the TNLA, both of which have been pushed into negotiations for a ceasefire with the SAC by China. This provides the Tatmadaw forces time and breathing space to regroup and counterattack rebel positions in other regions of the country. In addition, the Trump administration removed sanctions targeting three businesses and their owners on July 25th - all of which are staunch allies of the SAC and produce machinery and equipment used by the Tatmadaw. This comes after Trump received a letter from the SAC leader, Min Aung Hlaing, last week both praising the administration and asking for a better tariff deal. The Trump administration has since claimed the letter had no impact on the decision to remove sanctions.

Despite these recent successes for the SAC, the situation overall shows that it is slowly losing its grip on the country. In recent months the Tatmadaw has conscripted tens of thousands of men and women to participate in front-line combat with little training, hoping to reach 50,000 conscripts per year. The SAC began targeting those that were 18-35 years of age after reimplementing the dormant conscription law in 2024, however there are reports that the SAC has resorted to kidnapping old men and children in order to forcibly conscript them demonstrating the attitudes of the populace towards the regime. This has led to reduced combat effectiveness, low morale, and frequent desertions within the Tatmadaw ranks. This coupled with the Tatmadaw strategy of defending towns and cities and leaving the countryside largely uncontested has led to a situation where many Tatmadaw units have become surrounded and isolated only receiving supplies either by boat or airdrops. This not only makes it difficult to coordinate large counter-offensives and ties down troops which could be used in other regions, but it also constricts vital transportation and supply routes, making it much easier for resistance forces to siege and then seize isolated outposts, villages, and towns.