Due to the likelihood that Colombia could return to the “Plan Colombia” model of using military force, with US aid, to target guerilla groups after the 2026 elections it is likely that the ELN will continue to consolidate its forces and illicit funding schemes within Venezuelan territory. The ELN initially began to expand into Venezuela in 1992, prior to Hugo Chavez’s electoral victory in 1998.

Unlike its deep-rooted influence, the ELN enjoys in Venezuela today, it was largely restricted to the smuggling of contraband across the border while also using Venezuela’s border state of Apure as a safe haven from Colombian security forces, which allowed the ELN to slowly grow its influence in rural Venezuelan communities. One major reason for this slow expansion was due to the successive pro-US regimes of the “Puntofijo Pact”, a power sharing agreement between the three largest political parties in Venezuela from 1958-1998, similar to Colombia’s National Front government.

This led to the ELN conducting multiple attacks on the Venezuelan armed forces in the late 1990s, including a 1995 attack on the Cararabo naval base in Venezuela’s western Apure state which killed 8 Venezuelan marines. Similarly to the Maduro regime, past pro-US regimes faced drug trafficking allegations and human rights violations. In 1993, it was alleged that the CIA had been working with the Venezuelan national guard to traffic cocaine into the United States from 1990-1991. Although no one was ever convicted, an internal CIA report stated CIA agents in Venezuela “used bad judgment and poor management”.

With the establishment of a left-wing government in 1999 under Hugo Chavez and increased military pressure on the ELN due to Colombia’s growing relationship with the US under “Plan Colombia” in 2000 had led the ELN to divert more resources to its activities in Venezuela. Likewise, Chavez grew close to the ELN as both the PSUV and the ELN shared similar ideologies while Chavez also believed the ELN could be used to weaken the pro-US regime of Alvaro Uribe. In 2016, the FARC reached an agreement with the Colombian government which saw the group disbanded and the creation of a legal political party “Commune”. The ELN quickly took advantage of this development and took over areas previously under the FARCs control, including Colombian border departments in Norte de Santander, Arauca, Vichada, Cesar, and La Guajira.

Coinciding with this the ELN subsequently took control of the largest area of coca fields in Colombia greatly expanding its influence in border regions and rural agricultural communities. Additionally, ELN presence in Venezuela greatly expanded. Not only was it present in Venezuela’s border states of Zulia and Apure, but has since spread to the states of Barinas, Bolivar, and Amazonas. The ELN has allegedly also created urban units in many Venezuelan cities. Today, the ELN is believed to have several thousand fighters in Venezuela largely used for social control, illicit financing, and military camps outside the reach of Colombian security forces.

The most recent sign of the ELNs expansion and dominant position in Colombia and Venezuela is the groups successful Catatumbo offensive in early January 2025. The conflict was centered on the ELNs objective of taking the entire border area in the region of Catatumbo known for its concentration of coca fields from Frente 33, a FARC dissident faction involved in cocaine trafficking and other illicit schemes. Over 80 civilians and guerillas were killed with nearly 40,000 civilians fleeing the violence to regional urban centers during the nearly month long conflict. The Colombian government subsequently ended its peace dialogue with the ELN, but the ELN had succeeded and now largely controls Catatumbo’s border with Venezuela demonstrating the ELNs dominant position and close relationship with the Venezuelan regime.

A Mutual Relationship

With the ELNs expansion across the majority of Venezuela’s western and southern states it has become a binational actor, frequently conducting attacks against Colombian security forces and other Colombian paramilitary groups. The ELN gains many benefits from its mutual relationship with the PSUV. First, the ELN gains a stable base of operations within Venezuela outside of Colombian state control. This allows the group to conduct illicit financing between borders. The largest of these illicit markets is the cocaine trade. Roughly 12% of Colombia’s coca fields are located in the recently captured Catatumbo region. Furthermore, cocaine processing laboratories are prevalent on both sides of the border with Venezuelan security forces largely turning a blind eye to the ELNs cocaine activities while clamping down on other narcotic traffickers in Venezuela.

Established trafficking routes run along the border allowing the ELN to both traffic narcotics with relative ease and tax other traffickers and smugglers attempting to cross the border. While coca fields are less prevalent on the Venezuelan side of the border in states such as Zulia and Apure, analysts have noted that due to the ELNs prevenance more farmers are turning to coca cultivation. The ELN has also constructed multiple clandestine airstrips and cocaine processing labs in Venezuela, making it difficult for Colombian security forces to stimy the flow of narcotics onto the international market. The ELN also controls several goldmines in Venezuela particularly in Amazonas state, even bringing in mining equipment to increase efficiency and profit, although this has led to disputes between the ELN, Venezuelan government, and other non-state actors including FARC dissidents.

More importantly the ELN has begun to exert social control over Venezuela’s border regions. In states such as Apure, the ELN is the primary governmental body. The group collects revolutionary taxes from civilians and businesses in their areas of operation, allegedly charging a 5% tax on most business deals in border regions. As such, the ELN runs the judicial system and other social services, solidifying a legitimate role among communities in Venezuela’s border regions. Due to the ELNs close links to the PSUV it has even fielded candidates on the PSUV ticket in Venezuelan elections. In some regions such as Tachira, the local population has turned toward the ELN rather than the Venezuelan government as they see the group as more effective and better at resolving disputes.

The Venezuelan governments relationship with the ELN has allowed it to use the group as a state paramilitary. The ELN has been known to suppress dissent against the PSUV especially during election cycles where the group intimidates voters at voting centers, arrests dissidents, and stages “armed strikes”, shutting down core sectors of local economies at the direction of the PSUV. The ELN also works closely with Venezuelan security forces to target other guerilla groups and criminal organizations.

This has been most impactful in Venezuela’s porous border regions where Colombian right-wing paramilitaries and dissident guerilla groups used the border region for narcotics trafficking, allowing the state to reassert control over Apure, Zulia, and Tachira states. In one operation in March of 2022, the ELN assisted the National Bolivarian Armed Forces (FANB) against FARC dissidents showing the close relationship between the Venezuelan state and the ELN. Most importantly. The regime also gains a steady revenue stream from the ELN due to taxes put on the groups illicit activates giving the relationship a symbiotic character. 

Possible Ramifications

In the event that the US were to invade or topple the PSUV led Venezuelan government, taking control of the entire country would be costly and difficult. First, the Venezuelan military is closely linked to the PSUV and strictly follows the Chavista ideology. Although certain elements may defect in the case of a US attack, a portion would likely wage a guerilla war against US and Venezuelan opposition forces, as the military swore allegiance to Venezuela’s interim president, Delcy Rodriguez, on January 4th. In Venezuela’s cities, including Caracas, pro-regime paramilitaries called Colectivos would wage an urban insurgency against the United States or any government the US would install. Analysts doubt the effectiveness of these groups due to poor training and arms making it likely that the colectivos would be used as support groups for the better trained FANB and conduct small-scale hit and run ambushes.

Outside of the FANB the ELN is the single largest threat to both the US and a possible new western aligned regime. The ELN announced that it will defend the regime shortly after Maduro’s capture in a filmed address from the ELNs Eastern War Front. Due to the Eastern War Front’s control of the border, it has become the ELNs most organized and profitable unit and is largely responsible for the groups Venezuela operations. Interestingly, the Segunda Marquetalia FARC dissident bloc announced it would also defend Venezuela’s sovereignty, despite its limited presence and rivalry over Venezuela’s illicit economy with the ELN.

This may show that US policy is driving regional far-left militant groups together in the face of a US invasion, which could ultimately lead to a renewed, although unsteady, ELN-FARC alliance in Colombia’s eastern departments. The ELN has waged a guerilla campaign in Colombia for over 60 years and has grown more since its peak in the mid 1990s with between 5,000-6,000 fighters. The ELNs guerilla warfare tactics have made it difficult for Colombian security forces to combat despite over $13 billion in security assistance and training from the United States. As such, the group would make it difficult for US forces to take and hold towns in the rural jungle terrain which would lead to a protracted and costly engagement for US forces.