The U.S. Space Force is exploring hardware and software upgrades to three of its space electromagnetic warfare systems, including the Counter Communications System, as part of a broader push to stay ahead of fast-moving jamming and spoofing threats. The effort reflects lessons from recent conflicts, where electronic warfare has disrupted satellite links and navigation services relied on by militaries, airlines, and consumers alike.

Shaping a faster, more adaptable toolkit

Space Systems Command, the Space Force’s acquisition arm, is asking industry to demonstrate improvements for a trio of space electronic warfare systems. Trade reporting points to the Counter Communications System— a deployable, ground-based capability designed to temporarily deny an adversary’s satellite communications— as one of the platforms in line for upgrades. While the service hasn’t detailed every component publicly, the direction is clear: make systems more software-driven, easier to update, and better able to operate in a crowded and contested radiofrequency environment. That typically means modular hardware, open architectures, and cyber hardening so teams can push new signal-processing techniques into the field quickly rather than waiting years for a major hardware refresh.

The Counter Communications System itself is not new. The Air Force first fielded it in the 2000s and the Space Force declared its latest version operational in 2020. The service has consistently described it as producing “reversible,” non-destructive effects— a deliberate choice meant to impose costs on an adversary without creating space debris. Asking industry for demonstrations now suggests the Space Force wants to keep that capability current as satellite constellations proliferate and waveforms evolve, and to align with its broader push for rapid, iterative upgrades across the space enterprise.

A world where interference is routine, not rare

If this sounds technical, the drivers are very real. Over the past several years, electronic warfare has become a daily feature of conflicts from Eastern Europe to the Middle East. Ukrainian and Russian forces have traded jamming and spoofing that at times degraded GPS reception and satellite communications near the front. Civil aviation authorities in Europe and the Middle East have warned airlines about increased GNSS interference along certain routes, with pilots reporting navigation anomalies and cockpit alerts. In Israel and neighboring airspace, military counter-drone measures have at times coincided with GPS disruptions affecting civilians. And on the maritime side, ship captains have reported spoofed locations near conflict zones and sensitive coastlines.

All of this underscores why militaries are investing both in protecting their own links and in being able to hold an adversary’s satellite-dependent systems at risk without touching the satellites themselves. It’s not just about wartime contingencies. Routine military operations— from humanitarian relief to disaster response— depend on reliable satellite communications and navigation. When interference becomes common, commanders need tools that can diagnose what’s happening, pinpoint sources, work around the disruption, or, if ordered, neutralize an adversary’s ability to jam beyond the Pentagon

Satellites don’t just serve soldiers. Timing signals from GPS underpin financial transactions and power grids. Satellite internet and television reach remote communities, and satellite phones often fill the gaps when disasters knock out terrestrial networks. Upgraded electronic warfare systems can help on the defensive side by improving detection and geolocation of interference, which in turn helps regulators, commercial operators, and allied governments mitigate or attribute harmful activity more quickly. On the offensive side, U.S. officials emphasize non-kinetic, reversible effects to lower the risks of debris and escalation. Even so, as more countries develop counterspace tools, norms and transparency matter: how such systems are used, how effects are bounded, and how militaries communicate to avoid miscalculation will shape trust in the space domain.

For U.S. allies and partners who share satellite infrastructure or buy American-made systems, these upgrades also signal where the market is heading. Expect more emphasis on software-upgradable radios, spectrum agility, and built-in resilience. Commercial satellite firms— especially those operating large low-Earth orbit constellations— are already investing in similar defenses, and there’s growing collaboration between government and industry on interference reporting and rapid countermeasures

In practical terms, keep an eye on how Space Systems Command structures this effort. Demonstration-based competitions, rapid prototyping agreements, and open-system requirements point to a faster cycle of fielding and updates if industry can deliver. Watch for joint testing with commercial satellite providers, since many real-world interference incidents show up first on commercial networks. Internationally, look for allied participation or parallel investments, particularly among NATO members that have flagged counterspace threats in recent communiqués. And on the diplomatic front, technical progress will run alongside slow but ongoing talks at the United Nations and other forums about responsible military behavior in space.

The bottom line is straightforward: satellite links are now contested terrain. The Space Force’s move to upgrade its electronic warfare kit is less about building something flashy and more about making sure the U.S. and its partners can keep critical services running— and, when necessary, deny an adversary the same— in an era when interference has become part of the noise of modern life.